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Abstract
A physical theory is a partially interpreted axiomatic formal system
(L,S), where L is a formal language with some logical, mathematical and
physical axioms, and with some derivation rules, and the semantics S is
a relationship between the formulas of L and some states of affairs in
the physical world. In our ordinary discourse, the formal system L is re-
garded as an abstract object or structure, the semantics S as something
which involves the mental/conceptual realm. This view is of course in-
compatible with physicalism. How can physical theory be accommodated
in a purely physical ontology? The aim of this paper is to outline an ac-
count for meaning and truth of physical theory, within the philosophical
framework spanned by three doctrines: physicalism, empiricism, and the
formalist philosophy of mathematics.
Introduction
1. All the forthcoming considerations will be based on the following three
philosophical premises.
Physicalism: everything is physical; all facts supervene on, or are necessi-
tated by, the physical facts.
Empiricism: genuine information about the world can be acquired only by
a posteriori means.
Formalism: logic and mathematics are thought of as statements about ma-
nipulations with meaningless symbols.
I won’t argue for these doctrines in this paper – they are legitimate philosophi-
cal positions. I take them as initial premises. Rather, I will discuss a few radical
consequences of them, concerning the fundamental nature of logic and math-
ematics, and the structure of physical theories. Nevertheless, it must be men-
tioned that the ontological doctrine of physicalism is of primary importance,
which, in some sense, implies both formalism and empiricism. The first impli-
cation is rather trivial. Physicalism denies the existence of mental and abstract
entities; consequently, there is no room left for any kind of platonism or mental-
ism in the philosophy of logic and mathematics. Therefore, formalism – more
precisely, what we will call physco-formalism – seems to be the only account
for logic and mathematics that can be compatible with physicalism. Regarding
the second implication, we will see in point 10 that empiricism will be a conse-
quence of our physico-formalist account of the semantics of physical theory.
In the first section I will outline the basic ideas of physico-formalist philos-
ophy of mathematics. In the second section, combining the physico-formalist
approach to formal system with an intuition we can learn from Gödel’s proof
of incompleteness theorem, I will sketch a physicalist–formalist–empiricist – or
shortly, physicalist – theory of meaning and truth with respect to physical theo-
ries.
Physico-formalist philosophy of mathematics
2. Physico-formalist interpretation of mathematics (Szabó 2003; 2012) is a
reflection to the following fundamental problem: If physicalism is true, then
the logical/mathematical facts must be necessitated by the physical facts of the
world. This raises the question: How can the logical and mathematical facts
be accommodated in a purely physical ontology? In order to answer this ques-
tion, first we need to clarify: What is it that has to be accounted for within a
physicalist ontology? What are the logical/mathematical facts?
Our starting point is the formalist thesis. In Hilbert’s famous formulation it
says:
The formalist thesis: “Mathematics is a game played according to
certain simple rules with meaningless marks.” (Bell 1951, 38)
In other words, a mathematical statement/fact/truth is like “Σ ` A” – with single
turnstile, it must be emphasized. Note that this claim is more radical than, as
sometimes called, “if-thenism”, according to which the truth of A is based on
the assumption that the premises in Σ are true. According to the formalist view,
neither A nor the elements of Σ are statements, which could be true or false.
2
laptop
Figure 1: A formal system represented in a laptop with an inserted CD. The CD
contains a program making the computer to list the theorems of the formal system
They are just strings, formulas of the formal system in question. Derivation
is not a truth preserving “if-then”-type reasoning as traditionally taken, but a
mechanistic operation with meaningless strings of symbols.
3. This is the point where physico-formalist philosophy of mathematics starts.
We turn to the following question: Where are the states of affairs located in
the ontological picture of the world that make propositions like “Σ ` A” true or
false? The physico-formalist answer is this:
The physico-formalist thesis: A formal system should be regarded
as a physical system which consists of signs and derivational mecha-
nisms embodied in concrete physical objects, concrete physical con-
figurations, and concrete physical processes.
Therefore, a “Σ ` A”-type mathematical proposition expresses an objective fact
of the formal system as a particular portion of the physical world.
One can argue for this physicalist account of formal system in three steps.
(For more detailed argumentation see Szabó 2012).
(I) A formal systems can be represented in a physical system. Imagine a
laptop with an inserted CD (Fig. 1). The CD contains a program completely de-
termining the laptop’s behavior: in some order, the computer lists the theorems
(together with the proofs) of a formal system. I think, it is commonly accepted
to say that in the “computer + CD” system we have “a physical representation of
the formal system” in question. In this representation, “Σ ` A” (that is, formula
A is printed) becomes a fact of the physical reality inside the dotted line.
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(II) All mathematical facts can be thought of as a physical fact in some
physical representation. It is because, in Curry’s words, “in order to think of a
formal system at all we must think of it as represented somehow”. (Curry 1951,
30) This is in agreement with the widely accepted view in the recent literature
on physical computation that “it is only physical objects, such as computers or
human brains, that ever give us glimpses of the abstract world of mathematics”.
(Deutsch et al. 2000, 265)
(III) Actually, there is nothing to be “represented”; there is nothing be-
yond the flesh and blood formal systems. Consider the context of the above
quoted sentence of Curry:
[A]lthough a formal system may be represented in various ways, yet
the theorems derived according to the specifications of the primi-
tive frame remain true without regard to changes in representation.
There is, therefore, a sense in which the primitive frame defines a
formal system as a unique object of thought. This does not mean
that there is a hypostatized entity called a formal system which ex-
ists independently of any representation. On the contrary, in order
to think of a formal system at all we must think of it as represented
somehow. But when we think of it as formal system we abstract
from all properties peculiar to the representation. (Curry 1951, 30)
But, what does such an “abstraction” actually mean? What do we obtain if we
abstract from some unimportant, peculiar properties of a physical system L con-
stituting a “physical representation of a formal system”? In order to think of this
abstraction at all, in order to differentiate the important and unimportant fea-
tures of the physical system L, and to change from a more detailed description
of the system to a less detailed one, we must have a physical theory (M ,S) –
in the sense of the definition of physical theory in the next section – describing
the physical system L in question. However, the formal system M also is “repre-
sented somehow”, in Curry’s words; it is another flesh and blood formal system.
That is to say, the whole abstraction – the result of the abstraction included – is
contained in another flesh and blood formal system M . So, instead of obtain-
ing a non-physical “abstract formal system” we remain to have flesh and blood
formal systems.
Another way to think of this abstraction is to consider what is common to
the different “physical representations”, that is, to describe the common features
of different flesh and blood formal systems L1, L2, . . . Ln. But, to describe the
common features of physical systems L1, L2, . . . Ln we have to have a physical
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Figure 2: To describe the common features of physical systems L1, L2, . . . Ln we have
to have a physical theory (M ,S) which is capable of describing all L1, L2, . . . Ln
together
theory (M ,S) which is capable of describing all L1, L2, . . . Ln together (Fig. 2).
Only in a suitable formal system M it is meaningful to talk about similarity
or isomorphism between the structures describing L1, L2, . . . Ln, and about the
equivalence class of these structures, which could be regarded as an “abstract
formal system”. But, all these objects live in the formal system M which also
is “represented somehow”, that is, in a formal system existing in the physical
world.
Thus, abstraction, properly understood, does not lead out of the physical
realm. It does not produce “abstract formal systems” over and above the phys-
ically existing “representations”. Actually, there is nothing to be “represented”;
there is nothing beyond the flesh and blood formal systems. That is to say, a
formal system “as formal system” is a part of the physical reality. Consequently,
any statement about a formal system – including a statement like “Σ ` A” – is a
statement of a physical fact; and it has exactly the same epistemological status
as any other statements about the physical world.1
1Let me emphasize the distinction between the physico-formalist interpretation of mathemat-
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4. There are far-reaching consequences of the above considerations concern-
ing an old problem of empiricism. In Ayer’s words:
Where the empiricist does encounter difficulty is in connection with
the truths of formal logic and mathematics. For whereas a scientific
generalization is readily admitted to be fallible, the truths of math-
ematics and logic appear to everyone to be necessary and certain.
But if empiricism is correct no proposition which has a factual con-
tent can be necessary or certain. Accordingly the empiricist must
deal with the truths of logic and mathematics in one of the follow-
ing ways: he must say either that they are not necessary truths, in
which case he must account for the universal conviction that they
are; or he must say that they have no factual content, and then he
must explain how a proposition which is empty of all factual content
can be true and useful and surprising. ...
If neither of these courses proves satisfactory, we shall be obliged
to give way to rationalism. We shall be obliged to admit that there
are some truths about the world which we can know independently
of experience; ... (Ayer 1952, 72.)
The physico-formalist approach resolves this difficulty in the following way:
1. Logical and mathematical truths express objective (mind independent)
facts of a particular part of the physical world, namely, the facts of the
formal systems themselves. As such, they are synthetic, a posteriori, not
necessary, and not certain; they are fallible.
2. But they have contingent factual content, as any similar scientific asser-
tion, so they “can be true and useful and surprising”. The logical and
mathematical facts can be discovered, like any other facts of nature, just
like a fact about a plastic molecule, or other artifact.
ics and the so called immanent or physical realism in the sense of Mill. For example, ’a2+b2 = c2’
is a theorem of Euclidean geometry, {Euclidean} ` a2+ b2 = c2. According to immanent realism,
’a2+b2 = c2’ reflects some general truth about the real triangles in the physical world. Or at least,
in the sense of the structuralist version of immanent realism, the axiomatic theory “Euclidean ge-
ometry”, as a whole, expresses some true structural property of the physical world; something
about the congruence of rigid bodies, or the likes. The physico-formalist theory also claims that
{Euclidean} ` a2 + b2 = c2 expresses something in the physical world. But this something has
nothing to do with the physical triangles and rigid bodies. {Euclidean} ` a2+ b2 = c2 expresses a
property of the formal system “Euclidean geometry”, a property of the physical system consisting
of the signs and the derivation mechanisms.
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3. The fact that the flesh and blood formal systems usually are simple phys-
ical systems of relatively stable behavior, like a clockwork, and that the
knowledge of logical and mathematical truths does not require observa-
tions of the physical world external to the formal systems explains the
universal illusion that logical and mathematical truths are necessary, cer-
tain and a priori.
Thus, empiricism is not challenged by the alleged necessary truths delivered by
logical and mathematical reasoning. On the contrary, consequent physicalism
can resolve the long-standing debate surrounding the truth-of-reasoning ver-
sus truth-of-facts dichotomy. Logical and mathematical truths are nothing but
knowledge obtained from experience with respect to particular physical sys-
tems, the formal systems themselves. Since logical and mathematical deriva-
tions are “reasoning” par excellence, one must conclude that reasoning does not
deliver to us necessary truths. Logical and mathematical reasoning is, if you
like, an experiment with a flesh and blood formal system. Therefore, we must
draw the epistemological conclusion: There is no higher degree of certainty
than available from experience.
5. Formal systems are man-maid physical objects. As such, they are not eternal
and not readily given to us. Nevertheless, it is of course not true that anything
can be created with arbitrary properties. The objective features of physical re-
ality predetermine what can be created and what cannot. For example, even if
we assume that there are no polyvinyl chloride molecules in the universe, ex-
cept the ones created by mankind, the laws of nature admit the possibility of
their existence and predetermine their properties. Similarly, the laws of nature
predetermine what kinds of formal system can exist. In this sense, the logical
and mathematical facts are eternal and independent from us. They are contin-
gent as much as the laws of nature are contingent. In other words, Paracelsus’
God can make “a triangle with four sides” exactly as well as “an ass with three
tails”.2
2Notice that this claim of contingency of logical and mathematical facts is quite different
from what we call mathematical contingentism in the debates about contingency vs. necessity
of the existence of mathematical entities (e.g. Field 1993; Colyvan 2000; Miller 2012). In the
physico-formalist approach a formula of a formal system carries no meaning; Platonic, fictional,
whatsoever. The meaningful statements of logic and mathematics, which can be true or false,
are of form “Σ ` A”. They do refer, indeed, to real facts of a real object: the physically existing
formal system. This object, as we will see in the next section, is indeed indispensable for our
physical theories. (Cf. Colyvan 2004)
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Physical theory
6. Following Carnap, a physical theory can be considered as a partially inter-
preted formal system, (L,S), providing a description of a certain part of physical
reality, U . In general, the system of axioms of L contains some logical axioms
and the derivation rules (ideally, the first-order predicate calculus with iden-
tity), the axioms of some mathematical theories, and, of course, some physical
axioms. (The distinction between “logical”, “mathematical”, and “physical” are
rather terminological/traditional than essential.) The semantics S is under-
stood as a kind of correspondence between (some of) the formulas of L and
the states of affairs in U . Consider an interpreted formula A in L. One has to
distinguish between the following two notions:
1. A is a theorem in L, L ` A.
2. A is true, that is, according to the semantics S, A refers to a state of affairs
in U , which is in fact the case.
For example, ‘The electric field strength of a point charge is kQr2 ’ is a theorem of
Maxwell’s electrodynamics – one can derive it from the Maxwell equations. On
the other hand, according to the semantics relating the symbols of the Maxwell
theory to the empirical terms, this sentence corresponds to an empirically ob-
servable fact of the physical reality.
A physical theory is considered to be true if these two things are in harmony:
if A is a prediction of the theory, L ` A, then it corresponds to a state of affairs
which is indeed the case in U . By and large, this is the standard picture of a
physical theory.
7. Let us turn to the ontological issues. It is perhaps not far from the truth to
say that the standard view regards the formal system L as an abstract object or
structure, the semantics S as something which involves the mental/conceptual
realm, and, of course, U as a part of the physical world. This view is of course
incompatible with physicalism. How can physical theory be accommodated in a
purely physical ontology? The L-part is already solved by the physico-formalist
interpretation of formal system and logical/mathematical fact. But, how can the
physicalist account for meaning and truth? Again, first we need to clarify what
it is that has to be accounted for; we need a definition of semantic relationship
between formulas of a formal system and states of affairs in the physical world.
The definition will be based on the intuition we can learn from Gödel’s con-
struction of representation of the meta-arithmetic facts in Peano arithmetic, in
the preparation of the first incompleteness theorem (e.g. Crossley et al. 1990,
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62). Let Pr(x , y) denote the meta-arithmetic fact that the formula–sequence of
Gödel number x constitutes a proof of the formula of Gödel number y . Accord-
ing to Gödel’s construction, every such meta-arithmetic fact Pr(x , y) is repre-
sented with a PA formula R(x , y) if the following condition is met: For all Gödel
numbers (x , y),
if Pr(x , y) is the case then ΣPA ` R(x , y)
if Pr(x , y) is not the case then ΣPA ` ¬R(x , y)
where ΣPA denotes the axioms of Peano arithmetic.
Mutatis mutandis: one is entitled to say that a formula A represents or means
a state of affairs a in U , if the following two conditions are met:
(a) There exist a family {Aλ}λ of formulas in L and a family {aλ}λ of
states of affairs in U , such that A= Aλ0 and a = aλ0 for some λ0.
(b) For all λ,
if aλ is the case in U then Σ ` Aλ
if aλ is not the case in U then Σ ` ¬Aλ
8. Turning to the ontological issues, it must be clear that aλ – as a symbol in
the meta-language we use to describe the semantic relationship – stands for a
state of affairs, a configuration of the physical world. It is not a linguistic object,
it is not a “sentence of the theory expressing the state of affairs” in question. It
is Aλ that is a linguistic object, a formula of L, that can refer to aλ, given that
condition (b) holds.
According to the physico-formalist approach “Σ ` Aλ” and “Σ ` ¬Aλ”, re-
spectively, are states of affairs in the physical world, facts of the flesh and blood
formal system L. Thus, what we observe in condition (b) is a kind of regularity
or correlation between physical facts of two parts of the physical world, L and
U . More precisely, it should be a real correlation. To explain what “real” means
here, let me give a simple example. Imagine a computer programmed such that
entering a random number z ∈ (0,90) it calculates by applying some laws of
physics whether the bullet shot from the gun will land in the plate or not if the
angle of inclination is z (Fig. 3). At the same time we perform the experiment
with a randomly chosen angle of inclination α ∈ (0, 90). Now, imagine a lab-
oratory record as in Table 1. In this table, the pairing between the facts of the
computer and the facts of the experiment was based on simultaneity. It is based
on a real physical circumstance establishing a real conjunctive relation between
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Figure 3: Imagine a computer programmed such that entering a random number
z ∈ (0,90) it calculates whether the bullet will land in the plate or not if the angle
of inclination is z. At the same time we perform the experiment with a randomly
chosen angle of inclination α ∈ (0,90).
α Outcome z Result
88.23 - 30.78 Yes
79.56 - 11.32 No
30.78 Buuum! 79.56 No
11.32 - 28.77 Yes
28.77 Buuum! 88.23 No
29.02 Buuum! 62.25 No
62.25 - 34.21 Yes
36.54 Buuum! 29.02 Yes
34.21 Buuum! 36.54 Yes
Table 1: Pairing by simultaneity
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α Outcome z Result
88.23 - 11.32 No
79.56 - 79.56 No
30.78 Buuum! 30.78 Yes
11.32 - 88.23 No
28.77 Buuum! 28.77 Yes
29.02 Buuum! 34.21 Yes
62.25 - 62.25 No
36.54 Buuum! 29.02 Yes
34.21 Buuum! 36.54 Yes
Table 2: A conceived pairing
α Outcome z Result
11.32 - 11.32 No
28.77 Buuum! 28.77 Yes
29.02 Buuum! 29.02 Yes
30.78 Buuum! 30.78 Yes
34.21 Buuum! 34.21 Yes
36.54 Buuum! 36.54 Yes
62.25 - 62.25 No
79.56 - 79.56 No
88.23 - 88.23 No
Table 3: The normal pairing by the angle of inclination
the elements of the two families. There is no correlation; condition (b) is not
satisfied.
One can however conceive another parametrization of the two families as is
shown in Table 2, according to which condition (b) is satisfied. Are we entitled
to say that the computer makes real correct predictions? That a given “Yes” is a
prediction of “Buuum!”? Of course not, because this parametrization is only a
conceived one; it does not establish a real conjunctive relationship.
Finally, compare this with the normal situation when the pairing is based on
the angle of inclination (Table 3). This parametrization is based on a real phys-
ical circumstance establishing real conjunctive relation between the elements
of the two families. There is maximal correlation; condition (b) is satisfied.
The upshot is that parameter λ in conditions (a) and (b) is not completely
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arbitrary3; not simply an “abstract” or conceived parametrization. It must have
a physical realization, establishing a real conjunctive relationship between aλ
and Aλ, by which condition (b) expresses a real correlation between physical
facts of L and physical facts of U .
With this strengthening all elements of semantic relationship become ac-
commodated in the physical world.
9. A few important remarks are in order.
1. As we have seen, to be a meaning-carrier is not simply a matter of conven-
tion or definition or declaration. Semantics is not an arbitrary assignment
of states of affairs of the world to linguistic elements of the theory.
2. It is pointless to talk about the meaning of an isolated formula of the
theory. (Semantic holism) It is not only because of condition (a), but
also because in condition (b) a big part of the axiomatic system can be
involved.
3. It must be recognized that condition (b) is nothing but the necessary and
sufficient condition for the theory (L,S) to be true. That is, the two con-
ceptions meaning and truth are completely intertwined.
4. As semantics, in the above holistic sense, is a part and parcel of physical
theory, no physical theory without semantics. Therefore, in case of empir-
ical failure of a physical theory, semantics is one of the possible subjects of
revision. In other words, semantics is as much hypothetical as any other
part of the theory. For example, given that L is consistent, one can easily
see that the following statements cannot hold true at the same time:
(i) A refers to a
(ii) L ` A
(iii) a is not the case in U
since (i) and (iii) would imply L ` ¬A. Therefore, observing that a is
not the case we are not entitled to say that we observe that “¬A”. Simply
because if a is not the case, then condition (b) fails, the whole semantics
is lost. Therefore ¬A does not carry meaning at all. That is to say, the
state of affairs when a is not the case is something unexpressed, a brute
phenomenon. This sheds light on the constitutive role of semantics, or
rather, of the whole theory, in the sense of Reichenbach’s “constitutive a
priori” (Reichenbach 1965).
3I am grateful to Márton Gömöri for calling my attention to this issue.
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10. Thus, as we discussed in point 8, condition (b) requires a real correlation
between physical facts of two parts of the physical world, L and U . Combining
this with the thesis of
(1) the causal closeness of the physical world, and
(2) the principle of common cause4,
one must conclude that both semantic relationship and the truth of the physical
theory (consequently, our knowledge) must be brought about by the underly-
ing causal processes of the physical world, going on in the common causal past
of the two parts of the world L and U . This underlying process is what we
normally call learning through experience. This is a very strong support of em-
piricism. No knowledge of the physical world is possible without experience.
By the same token, no semantically meaningful talk about the physical world
is possible without experience. There is no a priori meaning and there is no a
priori truth.
In agreement with what was said in point 4, it is worthwhile mentioning that
the same is true with respect to the meta-mathematical theories. According to
the physico-formalist claims, a formal system is a particular part of the physical
world. Any theory describing a formal system, therefore, describes a part of the
physical world; that is, it is a particular case of physical theory. There is no a
priori meaning and truth in a meta-mathematical theory either.
11. It is a deep belief of many physicists that mathematics provides us the key
ideas that are realized in the natural world. In Einstein’s words:
Our experience up to date justifies us in feeling sure that in Nature
is actualized the ideal of mathematical simplicity. It is my convic-
tion that pure mathematical construction enables us to discover the
concepts and the laws connecting them which give us the key to
the understanding of the phenomena of Nature. Experience can of
course guide us in our choice of serviceable mathematical concepts;
it cannot possibly be the source from which they are derived; expe-
rience of course remains the sole criterion of the serviceability of a
mathematical construction for physics, but the truly creative prin-
ciple resides in mathematics. In a certain sense, therefore, I hold it
to be true that pure thought is competent to comprehend the real,
as the ancients dreamed. (Einstein 1934, 167)
4I mean the Reichenbachian thesis that no correlation without causation; every correlation
is either due to a direct causal effect, or is brought about by a third factor, a so-called common
cause (e.g. Reichenbach 1956; Hofer-Szabó et al. 2013).
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One might raise the question, if mathematics is only about the formal systems
without meaning, how it is, then, possible that mathematical structures prove
themselves to be so expressive in the physical applications. As Richard Feynman
put it: “I find it quite amazing that it is possible to predict what will happen by
mathematics, which is simply following rules which really have nothing to do
with the original thing.” (Feynman 1967, 171)
Let me start with mentioning that it is not mathematics alone by which the
physicist can predict what will happen, but physical axioms and mathematics
together. The physical axioms are determined by empirical facts. More ex-
actly, the physicist, keeping, as long as possible, the logical and mathematical
axioms fixed, tunes the physical axioms such that the theorems derivable from
the unified system of logical, mathematical, and physical axioms be compatible
with the empirical facts. Consequently, the employed logical and mathematical
structures in themselves need not reflect anything about the real world in order
to be useful.
Let me explain this with an analogy. You can experience a similar situation
when you change the mouse driver on your computer (or just change the mouse
settings): first you feel that the pointer movements (“derived theorems”) gener-
ated by the new driver (“mathematics”) according to your previously habituated
hand movements (“physical axioms”) do not faithfully reflect the geometry of
your screen. Then, keeping the driver (and driver settings) fixed, you tune your
hand movements – through typical “trial and error” learning – such that the
generated pointer movements fit to the arrangement of your screen content.
Thus, there is no miraculous “preadaption” involved just because certain
aspects of empirical reality “fit themselves into the forms provided by mathe-
matics”. This is simply a result of selections made by the physicist. Just as there
is no preadaption at work when you successfully can install kitchen units ob-
tained from a department store in your kitchen. The rules according to which
the shelves, cupboards and doors can be combined show nothing about the ac-
tual geometry of your kitchen. But the final result is that the kitchen “fits itself”
to the form of the whole set, as if through a kind of preadaption.
12. The constitutive role of formal systems in our physical knowledge by no
means entitles us to say that there is a hypostatized a priori conceptual scheme
in terms of which we grasp the experienced physical reality, and that this con-
ceptual scheme generates analytic truths. For, what there is is anything but not
conceptual: we only have the flesh and blood formal systems without any ref-
erence or meaning. Once an otherwise meaningless formula of a formal system
is provided with meaning, in the sense of point 7, it becomes true or false in a
14
non-analytic sense.
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